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Abstract 
 
Recent work highlights that cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner’s dilemma (PD) 
is primarily driven by moral preferences for doing the right thing, rather than 
social preferences for equity or efficiency. By contrast, little is known on what 
motivates cooperation in the Stag-Hunt Game (SHG). Cooperation in the SHG 
fundamentally differs from cooperation in the PD in that it is not costly, but risky: 
players have no temptation to deviate from the cooperative outcome, but 
cooperation only pays off if the other player cooperates. Here, we provide data 
from a large (N=436), pre-registered, experiment. Contrary to what has been 
observed for the PD, we find that SHG cooperation is primarily driven by 
preferences for efficiency, rather than preferences for doing the right thing. 
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1. Introduction 
There is wide consensus among scholars that people’s capacity to cooperate is what has made 
human societies extremely successful, compared to other animal societies (Trivers, 1971; Ostrom, 2000; 
Skyrms, 2004; Rand & Nowak, 2013). Psychologists even argue that the psychological basis of 
cooperation, shared intentionality, is what makes humans uniquely humans, as it is possessed by children, 
but not by great apes (Tomasello et al., 2005). Not surprisingly, a great deal of research has sought to 
understand what makes people cooperate. 
Behavioral economists usually address this question by gathering experimental data on cooperative 
behavior. Cooperation between two players is typically modeled using either the Prisoner’s dilemma (PD) 
or the Stag-Hunt game (SHG). In the PD, players can either defect (A) or cooperate (B). The payoff 
consequences of each action are shown in Table 1: 
Table 1. Payoff table in the PD 
 A B 
A P, P T, S 
B S, T R, R 
  
where T > R > P > S. Thus, mutual defection (A, A) is the only equilibrium of the one-shot, 
anonymous, PD. Yet, this gives a smaller payoff than mutual cooperation (B, B), which requires that 
players override the temptation to free-ride by giving up their maximal individual payoff (T > R). Hence, 
PD cooperation is efficient but costly.   
The SHG fundamentally differs from the PD in that people have no temptation to defect, when the 
other cooperates. Yet, cooperation is risky, in that it is beneficial only if both players cooperate.  Thus, 
players in the SHG receive a small but certain payoff if they choose the “safe” option A (T = P). 
Cooperation (i.e., playing B) is “risky” because it offers a greater payoff, but only if the other cooperates. 
The consequence of this payoff structure (R > T = P > S) is that the SHG has two pure Nash equilibria: a 
risk-dominant equilibrium (A, A) where agents play safe, and a cooperative (payoff-dominant) equilibrium 
(B, B), which is efficient (Harsanyi & Selten, 1988; Schmidt et al. 2003). 
Previous work on what motivates people to cooperate has mainly focused on the PD. There exists 
overwhelming evidence that people cooperate in this game (Rapoport et al. 1965; Mengel, 2017). This has 
yielded researchers to consider that people might exhibit distributional, social preferences for equity and/or 
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efficiency (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Engelmann & Strobel, 2004).1 However, this conclusion has been 
recently challenged by Capraro & Rand (2018), who found that cooperation in the one-shot, anonymous 
PD is not primarily driven by distributional motives, but rather by moral preferences for doing the right 
thing.  
By contrast, little is known on what motivates SHG cooperation. This is an important gap as the 
SHG has served to model cooperative behavior in several settings (Hardin, 1968; Kiss et al. 2017), to the 
point that it is considered the prototype of the social contract (Rousseau, 1754/1999; Skyrms 2004). Is 
SHG cooperation, like PD cooperation, driven by non-distributional, moral preferences for doing the right 
thing? Or, alternatively, is it primarily driven by distributional, social preferences for equity or efficiency? 
This study follows Capraro & Rand’s (2018) methodology to answer these questions.  
 
2. Methods 
 
2.1. Experimental design and procedures 
 
We conduct our experiment on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Arechar et al. 2018). The hypotheses, 
design, sampling and analysis plan were preregistered at http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=cv5ja2.2 
First, participants were randomly matched in pairs to play the SHG in Table 2. 3   
Table 2. Payoff table in the SHG 
 A B 
A 25, 25 25, 5 
B 5, 25 40, 40 
 
After making their choices, participants were matched in trios to play the Trade-Off Game (TOG) 
(Capraro & Rand, 2018; Tappin & Capraro, 2018). In this game, participants had to choose (as dictators) 
between an “equitable” allocation (13,13,13) that paid the same amount to all members of the trio, and an 
“efficient” allocation (13, 23,13) that paid more to one of the members, different from the dictator. The 
TOG choices were framed differently depending on the treatment condition (between-subjects, random 
assignment): 
 
1 Note that mutual cooperation is more equitable and efficient (under the additional assumption that 2R>T+S) than 
unilateral defection, thus people might prefer cooperation over unilateral defection if they have social preferences. 
2 See the Appendix for further details, including verbatim instructions.  
3 We adapt Game 2 in Rydval & Ortmann (2005) after dividing the payoffs by 2 to produce roughly 50% of efficient 
choices in the SHG. A payoff of 25 in our game corresponds to $0.25.  
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• TOG efficient frame. The efficient allocation was labeled as “be generous”; the equitable 
allocation, as “be ungenerous”.  
• TOG equitable frame. The equitable allocation was labeled as “be fair”; the efficient 
allocation, as “be unfair”.  
By this design choice, the efficient (equitable) allocation was framed as morally appropriate in the 
TOG efficient (equitable) frame, respectively. 4  
Our experiment concludes with standard demographic questions. Participants received a bonus for 
their choices in the SHG and the TOG in addition to their participation fee ($0.50).  
 
2.2. Hypotheses 
 
Capraro & Rand (2018) find that PD cooperation is correlated with the TOG positively framed 
option (whichever that is), thus they conclude that moral preferences drive PD cooperation. We use the 
same methodology to contrast the following pre-registered hypotheses: 
Efficiency preferences hypothesis. SHG cooperation is primarily driven by social preferences for 
efficiency: there is a positive correlation between the TOG efficient choice and SHG cooperation. 
Moral preferences hypothesis. SHG cooperation is primarily driven by moral preferences for doing 
the right thing: there is a positive correlation between the TOG positively framed choice and SHG 
cooperation.  
 
3. Results 
We have N=436 participants.5 Their behavior is summarized in Table 3.6  
  
 
 
4 Capraro & Rand (2018) show that participants in the TOG efficient (equitable) frame consider to “be generous” (“be 
fair”) as the morally right thing to do. 
5 Following our preregistered protocol, we exclude from the analysis participants who did not answer all the 
comprehension questions correctly and duplicate responses.  
6In line with Capraro & Rand (2018) and Tappin & Capraro (2018), we find a strong framing effect: participants are 
more likely to choose the TOG efficient allocation in the efficient frame (82.73% vs 37.50%). See Appendix C for 
details on the statistical analysis. 
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Table 3. Likelihood of choosing the efficient choice in the SHG and the TOG 
 N 
SHG 
cooperation 
TOG 
efficient 
SHG cooperation | TOG 
efficient allocation 
SHG cooperation |  
TOG equitable allocation 
TOG efficient frame 220 61.36 % 82.73% 60.99 % 63.16 % 
TOG equitable frame 216 64.35 % 37.50% 72.84 % 59.26 % 
 
As pre-registered, we contrast our hypotheses using logistic regressions to predict SHG behavior 
(1= cooperation, 0= safe choice). The independent variables include dummy variables for the TOG 
efficient choice, the TOG efficient frame, and their interaction. Table 4 presents the results (see Appendix 
C for the marginal effects).  
Table 4. Logit regressions predicting SHG cooperation. 
 
 (1) (2) 
   
Constant (b0) 0.375** 0.154 
 (0.175) (0.567) 
TOG Efficient Frame (b1) 0.164 0.171 
 (0.380) (0.394) 
TOG Efficient Choice (b2) 0.612** 0.642** 
 (0.305) (0.309) 
TOG Efficient Frame x TOG Efficient Choice (b3) -0.704 -0.801 
 (0.479) (0.492) 
   
Controls (Gender, Age, Education) No Yes 
   
   𝜒"#-test (H0: b1 + b3 = 0) 3.40* 4.54** 𝜒"#-test (H0: b2 + b3 = 0) 0.06 0.17 
   
LR-chi2 4.63 10.45 
Observations 436 426 
 
Note: Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
 
In line with the “efficiency preferences hypothesis”, column (1) reports a positive correlation 
between the TOG efficient allocation and SHG cooperation. This finding is robust when controlling for 
gender, age and the level of education, as pre-registered (see column (2)). Interestingly, the results seem to 
be driven by participants in the TOG equitable frame (p < 0.046); by contrast, those choosing the efficient 
allocation in the TOG efficient frame do not cooperate more than those choosing the equitable allocation (p 
> 0.80). Along these lines, SHG cooperation appears to be (weakly) more frequent among those choosing 
the TOG efficient allocation in the TOG equitable frame, compared to those choosing the same allocation 
in the efficient frame (p < 0.068). 
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4. Conclusion 
Recent work highlights that (one-shot, anonymous) PD cooperation is primarily driven by moral 
preferences for doing the right thing, rather than by distributional preferences for equity or efficiency 
(Capraro & Rand, 2018). The current paper adapts the research methodology in Capraro & Rand (2018) to 
investigate behavior in the SHG, where cooperation is not costly (there is no temptation to deviate from the 
cooperative outcome if the other player cooperates) but it is risky (cooperation pays off iff the other player 
cooperates).  
Our findings demonstrate that SHG cooperation is primarily driven by efficiency motives, rather 
than by moral preferences. Interestingly, this effect seems to be driven by the behavior in the TOG 
equitable frame, where the efficient allocation is negatively framed. We argue that participants choosing 
the efficient allocation in this frame are likely to have strong preferences for efficiency, strong enough to 
overcome the moral framing. In fact, people choosing the efficient allocation in the TOG equitable frame 
might have a stronger preference for efficiency than those in the TOG efficient frame, where the efficient 
allocation is “nudged”.  
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